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Abstract While in the familiar problem of optimal commodity taxation the govern-
ment faces a constraint on tax revenue, we consider the case of a consumption target
on a group of commodities (i.e., a weak constraint on total consumption), instead. This
optimal commodity tax problem with a consumption target brings about taxation rules
that are mainly at variance with the standard results of commodity taxation. In our
main theorem, we derive a general, though quite simple, rule of optimal commodity
taxation under a target on total consumption: in particular, we establish that higher
consumer prices should be charged for commodities with (1) high price elasticities of
total demand and (2) low consumption shares in total demand. From this theorem we
deduce three important corollaries: an anti-inverse elasticity result, an anti-Corlett–
Hague result and a uniform-pricing result. All of these results are (generically) at
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1 Introduction
The problem addressed in this paper is how a government facing a predetermined
consumption target for a group of commodities should set price-based instruments
such as taxes (or subsidies). Governments frequently face quantity targets, due to
either environmental or social reasons. For example, we may consider the target level
for some pollutant to protect the environment; or we may think of merit and demerit
goods where the government aims at meeting some specified (minimum respectively
maximum) level of consumption. Here, goods such as inoculation against a conta-
gious disease, education, cultural goods, sporting activities and safety precaution may
represent examples for the first category; and cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, prostitution,
and fuel consumption, for the second.1 Also, in view of scarce natural resources, the
quantity target may represent the sustainable yield of a renewable resource such as
fish, game, timber, etc. Finally, in both trade theory and policy quantity targets are
not unusual. For example, import quotas for some classes of goods are imposed to
protect domestic industries or to discriminate against a foreign country; and for similar
reasons, voluntary export restrains may be applied. In all of these cases a government
may consider applying familiar fiscal instruments—taxes and subsidies imposed on
these goods—to interfere with total consumption.2
Frequently, though, governments do not pursue their own objectives rigorously, but
compromise to some extent. In particular, governments often announce consumption
targets (e.g., on the reduction of environmentally harmful consumption) to be met in
the future, but then allow for some degree of deviation from those. To accommodate
for this observed behaviour, we formulate a model where non-compliance with the
consumption target is possible but is associated with some cost that is increasing and
convex in the degree of non-compliance.
Then, the problem of the government may be formulated as choosing consumer
prices for the different commodities to maximise consumer welfare minus the deviation
cost of missing the target consumption level. We assume that the target consumption
level is exogenous: it may be determined by either some political process (e.g., an
international environmental agreement), or by institutional constraints (constitutional
rights or laws protecting the environment), or it may represent the solution of some
more general optimisation problem (welfare maximisation). The particular source of
the target, though, is inessential here, and in this sense, our paper contributes to second-
1 For example, since 2003 the WHO requests member states to increase influenza vaccination coverage
of all people at high risk with the goal of attaining vaccination coverage of the elderly population of
75% by 2010 (56th WHA 2003). In 2009 the Council of the EU recommended member states to reach
this goal by the winter of 2014/2015 (European Commission 2009). As a second example consider the
governmental objective to reduce consumption of alcohol: in 2010 the Russian government, alarmed by
Russians’ excessive alcohol consumption, pledged to reduce alcohol consumption by 55% by 2020.
2 For instance, Article 6 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, 2003–2005) states
“…, each Party should take account of its national health objectives concerning tobacco control and adopt or
maintain, as appropriate, measures which may include: (a) implementing tax policies and, where appropriate,
price policies, on tobacco products so as to contribute to the health objectives aimed at reducing tobacco
consumption.” Similarly, environmental taxes are frequently employed to meet predetermined emission or
consumption targets. Notable examples are taxes on different types of fuel to accomplish specified CO2-
or NOx-emission levels.
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best taxation: we derive the optimal consumer prices, viz. optimal consumption taxes,
under a given consumption target, which itself may or may not be socially optimal.
It may be helpful to think of the target level as the total consumption of a group of
commodities generating an externality. To be specific, the target level may be seen as
the maximum amount of the emissions of a specified pollutant, such as CO2 or NOx.
Actually, many countries deploy environmental taxes to limit pollutant emissions from
transport, taxing different types of fuel, such as gasoline, diesel, etc., at different rates,
although the consumption of any of them results in the emission of the same pollutant,
e.g., CO2. (This observation still holds true even if we calculate tax rates on the basis
of their carbon content.)3 It is thus apparent that different commodities of fuel (or
more precisely, carbon contained in different types of fuel) may be, and actually are
taxed at different rates, while the political interest focuses on total consumption, e.g.,
on total CO2 emissions, rather than on its composition.
Yet, we do not restrict ourselves to the case of externalities. Rather, as mentioned
above, we allow for a broad interpretation of the predetermined target for the total
consumption of a group of commodities. Accordingly, we explore the fundamental
fiscal problem in a general setting: given the target level of total consumption, how
should taxes on different commodities be determined in order to accomplish that
target at lowest cost (or highest utility)? This approach is parallel to, though still
different from, the standard problem in the optimal taxation literature, where the utility
maximisation is subject to a constraint on tax revenue. Since the (weak) constraint4
we consider here is on consumption, rather than on tax revenue, we thus explore how
the presence of such a quantity constraint affects the existing results of the optimal
taxation literature obtained under a revenue constraint. To our knowledge, the role of
this type of a constraint has not yet been explored in the literature since the seminal
work of Ramsey (1927), whose contribution has recently been thoroughly reviewed
and re-evaluated by Stiglitz (2015). Yet, the apparently unnoticed issue of a (weak)
quantity constraint is too important to be neglected from a practical point of view as
explained above, and also from a theoretical point of view since this modification has
unconventional implications as we will demonstrate.
For the standard problem in public finance—utility maximisation subject to a rev-
enue constraint—the literature has established a series of fundamental and well-known
results. Among them, the following are the most notable. The inverse elasticity rule
(initiated by Ramsey 1927): higher tax rates should be imposed on goods with a less
elastic demand.5 The Corlett–Hague rule (originating with Corlett and Hague 1953):
higher tax rates should be imposed on goods with a lower compensated price elasticity
3 Actual tax rates on different types of fuel (and also on energy products and electricity) in the EU are
documented by the European Commission (2015). Using these figures it is simple to calculate prices of
carbon contained in a specific type of fuel by using the fact that, for example, each gallon of petrol contains
2421 g of carbon; and each gallon of diesel, 2778 g (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005).
4 The quantity constraint is weak in the sense that it is not strictly binding, but may be violated provided
that the decision maker is willing to carry the associated cost of missing the target.
5 The inverse elasticity rule has two versions, one for compensated demand and one for ordinary demand.
See, e.g., Sandmo (1987).
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of demand with respect to the price of an untaxed good (e.g., leisure).6 Uniform taxa-
tion (presented in Diamond and Mirrlees 1971; Sandmo 1974; Sadka 1977): the same
tax rates should be imposed on goods if, and only if, the compensated price elasticities
of the goods with respect to the price of an untaxed good are all equal.7
In this paper, we derive an optimal taxation rule when the government is constrained
by a target on the total consumption of a group of commodities. From this general
formula, we infer that higher consumer prices should be charged for commodities with
high price elasticities for the total demand and for commodities with low consumption
shares. Intuitively, this means that higher prices should be charged for those commodi-
ties whose prices induce large changes on the total demand (of all commodities). In
this way, the government takes advantage of the fact that comparatively small tax rates
may suffice to achieve the stipulated consumption target, and thus price distortions are
kept to a minimum. We then utilise our general taxation rule to deduce three specific
results, all of which are (generically) at variance with familiar rules of taxation. In
particular, we first derive an anti-inverse elasticity rule: higher consumer prices should
be charged for the commodities with a more elastic demand; and next, an anti-Corlett–
Hague rule: higher consumer prices should be charged for the commodities with the
higher compensated price elasticity with respect to an untaxed good. Both, the anti-
inverse elasticity rule and the anti-Corlett–Hague rule, counter traditional belief and
seem to be counter-intuitive in the first instance—but they are actually not: In order
for the same reduction in consumption to be accomplished, elastic demand requires
a smaller price increase than does inelastic demand, and therefore it is less costly (in
terms of reduced consumer surplus) to reduce the consumption of a commodity with
elastic rather than with inelastic demand. For this reason, it is more efficient to meet
a given target level of total consumption by taxing commodities with higher demand
elasticity more heavily than those with less elastic demand. In this way, the target level
can be accomplished by bringing forth rather small price distortions. This reasoning
applies irrespective of whether the target level has to be reached from above (reduction
of demand) or from below (increase of demand).
These results may also be compared with the familiar rules of optimal Pigouvian
taxation, when the consumption of a good, or its commodities, generates an externality.
For example, Sandmo (1975) considered such an optimal taxation problem under a
revenue constraint, and showed that the optimal tax rate of the externality-generating
good is a weighted average of its inverse price elasticity of demand and its marginal
social damage; moreover, the marginal social damage of the externality-generating
good enters the tax formula for that good in an additive way, while it does not enter the
tax formulas of all other goods.8 For this reason, Sandmo’s result may be regarded as a
6 For recent studies of this rule, see Kaplow (2010), who reconsidered the discussion of the rule in the
presence of an income tax in the literature, and Kleven et al. (2000), who showed a modified Corlett–Hague
rule for optimal taxation with household production.
7 Deaton (1979), Besley and Jewitt (1995), and Barbie and Hermeling (2009) provided conditions on
preferences for uniform commodity taxes to be optimal. In particular, these authors showed that uniform
commodity taxes are optimal if, and only if, preferences are implicitly (or quasi) separable between leisure
and consumption goods.
8 This additive property is a general feature of optimal taxation problems with externalities (see, e.g.,
Kopczuk 2003).
123
Optimal taxation under a consumption target 667
generalised (or augmented) inverse elasticity result. In view of this characterisation, a
comparison of Sandmo’s results with the taxation rules derived here—in a model where
a possible environmental damage is incorporated as a quantity target on consumption—
brings about the following observations: In both models, the tax rates are proportional
to the marginal damage associated with consumption. However, while in Sandmo’s
taxation rule the tax rates are inversely related to the relevant elasticities of demand,
the tax rates are directly related to those elasticities in our model, i.e., under a (weak)
quantity constraint. Also, the additive structure of Sandmo’s tax formulae—distortion
plus marginal damage—does not survive in our model: here the tax rates are the product
of the demand elasticity and the marginal damage. Consequently, optimal taxation
under a (fiscal) revenue constraint and under a quantity target on consumption (i.e., a
weak quantity constraint) bring about quite opposing taxation rules.
Beyond these differences in the formulae of optimal commodity taxation, it is
worthwhile to emphasise that the problem we consider here is also conceptually dif-
ferent from the standard optimal Pigouvian taxation problem: We are not interested in
a way to internalise consumption externalities, but rather seek the most efficient way
to control the total consumption of commodities generating an externality. In partic-
ular, we do not (explicitly) assume the presence of externalities in consumption but
model the deviation cost of missing a predetermined target consumption level. This
approach has practical relevance (especially in the example of CO2 emissions where
a government aims to reduce total CO2 emissions) as illustrated above, but, to our
knowledge, it has not been studied in the literature.
Finally, we also demonstrate that the solution of the optimal taxation problem under
a quantity target yields a (generalised) uniform-pricing result. This result is seemingly
in parallel with the well-known rule of uniform taxation: charging the same (weighted)
consumer price for all commodities is a solution if, and only if, the compensated price
elasticities of the commodities with respect to an untaxed good are all equal. However,
even though both results are obtained under the same elasticity condition, the uniform-
pricing result is at variance with the uniform taxation rule, unless all net prices are
equal: the uniform taxation rule implies that higher taxes should be imposed on goods
with higher net prices, while the uniform-pricing result implies that higher taxes should
be imposed on commodities with lower net prices (provided that taxes are positive).
In this sense, the uniform-pricing result may be referred to as an anti-uniform taxation
rule.
The fundamental reason that leads to these opposing taxation rules is the tax base
effect: any increase (decrease) in a tax rate causes an erosion (broadening) of the tax
base. While this reduction (enlargement) of the tax base is an unwelcome effect if the
government aims to collect (return) a given amount of public revenue at minimal social
cost, it is not only a welcome effect, but precisely the objective of the government to
reduce (increase) consumption if a consumption target has to be reached from above
(below). Thus, the reversal of the taxation rules mirrors the opposing objectives: non-
distortionary taxation versus demand-directing taxation.
In view of these findings, we may conclude the following: (1) the type of the
constraint for the optimal commodity taxation problem, a revenue constraint vs. a
quantity target, is crucial for the results and thus for policy implications; and (2)
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an accurate estimation of elasticities is crucial for practically determining tax rates
optimally.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we set up the problem of
the optimal commodity tax under a consumption target. This problem is then solved in
Sect. 3, where we also derive its policy implications. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 4.
2 Model
Assume that there are n commodities of a specific group, the (generic) quantities of
which we denote by x := (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+; and let p := (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+
be the corresponding net prices, which we assume to be fixed throughout. Suppose that
the set of these commodities is subject to unit taxes, denoted by t := (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈
R
n
, so that the consumer prices are given by q := (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn++ where
q ≡ p + t. Let x0  0 denote the (generic) quantity of a composite good, which is
not subject to taxation, so that its price is simply denoted by q0 > 0.
Suppose that a consumer’s preference relation is represented by a continuous utility
function u : Rn+1+ → R : (x0, x) → u(x0, x), which is strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave on Rn+1++ , with u(x0, x) = c for any (x0, x) ∈ Rn+1+ \Rn+1++ , for some
c ∈ R. The consumer chooses consumption of the n commodities and of the composite
good to maximise their utility u(x0, x) subject to their budget constraint∑ni=0 qi xi  I
where I > 0 represents the consumer’s income. This utility maximisation problem
yields ordinary (or Marshallian) demand functions, xm0 (q0, q, I ) and xm(q0, q, I )
along with the resulting indirect utility function V (q0, q, I ) ≡ u(xm0 (q0, q, I ),
xm(q0, q, I )). Correspondingly, the expenditure minimisation problem gives com-
pensated (or Hicksian) demand functions, xh0 (q0, q, v) and xh(q0, q, v), where v
represents a specified utility level.
The government chooses consumer prices q (or unit taxes t) to maximise the wel-
fare, given by the indirect utility V (q0, q, I ) minus a cost (or damage), D(Y ), where
D : R+ → R+ is continuous, increasing and convex, with D(0) = 0, and Y ≡ X − Z¯
denotes the deviation of total consumption X of the n commodities from the specified
target amount of total consumption Z¯ . The consumption target Z¯ is assumed to be
positive and finite. This cost function allows for some slackness in the achievement
of the consumption target, but missing the target is associated with some cost that is
increasing in the extent of the failure of fulfilment.9 Let ki  0 denote the weight of
commodity i in the total demand (e.g., the carbon content per consumption unit of
commodity i). Substituting the Marshallian total demand function for the n commodi-
ties Xm(q0, q, I ) ≡ ∑ni=1 ki xmi (q0, q, I ), into the cost function D the maximisation
problem of the government becomes10
9 The function D reflects the case that the target level has to be reached from above (reduction of demand).
More generally, to deal with the case that the target level has to be reached from below (increase of demand),
we may redefine a cost (or damage) function by D(|Y |) with Y ∈ R.
10 A special case of this problem is where there is a strictly binding constraint on consumption (i.e.,
Xm (q0, q, I ) = Z¯ ), rather than a target on which the government may compromise.
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Maximise
q
V (q0, q, I ) − D(Xm(q0, q, I ) − Z¯). (1)
Subsequently, we use the following elasticities: We define the elasticity of Mar-
shallian demand of commodity i with respect to the price of commodity j by
εmi j ≡ (∂xmi /∂q j )(q j/xi ); and, the elasticity of Hicksian demand of commodity i
with respect to the price of commodity j by εhi j ≡ (∂xhi /∂q j )(q j/xi ). In the follow-
ing, we simply write x j and X to denote the image of the demand functions under
consideration.
3 Results
Using ∂ Xm/∂q j = ∑ni=1 ki (∂xmi /∂q j ), the first order conditions of problem (1) are11
∂V
∂q j
− D′ ∂ X
m
∂q j
= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where D′ represents the marginal cost of over-consumption; and accordingly, the term
D′ki represents the associated marginal cost of commodity i . Applying Roy’s identity,
we obtain
− μx j − D′ ∂ X
m
∂q j
= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (2)
where μ ≡ ∂V/∂ I represents the marginal utility of income. Finally, using the Slutsky
equation, we may express Eq. (2) as








, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (3)
where Xh(q0, q, v) ≡ ∑ni=1 ki xhi (q0, q, v) is the Hicksian total demand function for
the n commodities.
Remark 1 Considering Eq. (2), we make the following observation: If we inter-
pret the term D′ki as the marginal damage of commodity i , and the government
applies Pigouvian taxation, by setting tax rates equal to the marginal damage, i.e.,








= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
which has the same form as the first order equations in the optimal taxation problem
with a revenue constraint [see, e.g., equation (12) in Sandmo 1974].
11 It can be shown that the second-order conditions are satisfied in suitably chosen examples (e.g., with a
Cobb-Douglas utility function and with D(Y ) ≡ Y a , a > 1).
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Let σmj ≡ (∂ Xm/∂q j )(q j/X) denote the elasticity of Marshallian total demand
with respect to the price of commodity j ; and ν j ≡ k j x j/X , the demand share of
commodity j . Also, let σ hj ≡ (∂ Xh/∂q j )(q j/X) denote the elasticity of Hicksian
total demand with respect to the price of commodity j ; and σI ≡ (∂ Xm/∂ I )(I/X),
the income elasticity of Marshallian total demand. Then, we obtain the following rule
of optimal taxation under a quantity target.
Theorem 1 (Optimal taxation under a quantity target) For the taxation problem (1)
the optimal consumer prices are (implicitly) given by





k j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4)
or equivalently by






1 − σI XI D
′
μ
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5)
Proof Multiplying both sides of Eq. (2) by q j/X and rearranging terms yields the first
equality; and re-writing Eq. (3) yields the second equality. unionsq
Theorem 1 gives the rule of optimal taxation under a quantity target in terms of
Marshallian and Hicksian demand functions, respectively; it implies that the solution
of problem (1) is proportional to the price elasticity, σmj or σ hj , and to the cost weight k j
(and thus to the marginal cost D′k j ), but is inversely proportional to the consumption
share ν j . That is, higher prices should be charged for commodities with high price
elasticities and low consumption shares. This finding holds irrespective of whether we
express the taxation rule in terms of Marshallian or Hicksian demand functions.
We next consider the special case where all cross price effects between the com-
modities are zero.
Corollary 1 (Anti-inverse elasticity result)
(i) Let ∂xmi /∂q j = 0 (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and i 	= j ). For the taxation problem (1)
the optimal consumer prices are (implicitly) given by
q j = − D
′
μ
k jεmj j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6)
(ii) Let ∂xhi /∂q j = 0 (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and i 	= j ). For the taxation problem (1)
the optimal consumer prices are (implicitly) given by
q j = D
′
θ
k jεhj j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (7)
where θ ≡ −μ + D′ ∂ Xm
∂ I , which is independent of j .
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Proof Using the fact that ∂ Xm/∂q j = ∑ni=1 ki (∂xmi /∂q j ), ∀ j , we obtain from Eq. (4)
that the optimal consumer prices for the taxation problem (1) are (implicitly) given by





kiεmi j xi , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (8)
Then the first equality immediately follows from Eq. (8). The second equality follows






εhji , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (9)
Then, using the assumption that ∂xhi /∂q j = 0 (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and i 	= j), the
result follows from the last equation. unionsq
According to Corollary 1, when either all compensated or all uncompensated cross
price effects between commodities are zero, a quite simple taxation rule applies: higher
prices should be charged for the commodities with the higher (own-) price elasticities
and higher weights (and thus with higher marginal costs). Again, this rule holds irre-
spective of whether we express the result in terms of the elasticities of Marshallian or
Hicksian demand functions. We thus found an anti-inverse elasticity result for both
Marshallian and Hicksian demand. Moreover, since Eq. (8) represents the generali-
sation of Eq. (6), we may regard the former as a generalised anti-inverse elasticity
result.
Corollary 2 (Anti-Corlett–Hague result) Let there be two commodities, i.e., n = 2.





21 + εh12 + εh10)
k2(εh12 + εh21 + εh20)
. (10)
Proof Using Eq. (9) for j = 1, 2, eliminating θ and using Hicks’ (1939) “third law”
yields Eq. (10). unionsq
It follows from Eq. (10) that for k1 = k2 we have: q1 ≷ q2 ⇔ εh10 ≷ εh20, provided
that the denominator and numerator of the right-hand side are positive. Accordingly,
a higher consumer price should be charged for the commodity with the higher com-
pensated price elasticity with respect to the composite good. We thus obtained an
anti-Corlett–Hague result.
Also, we are able to establish a generalised uniform-pricing result:
Corollary 3 (Generalised uniform-pricing result) For the taxation problem (1) the
optimal weighted consumer prices are all equal if, and only if, all commodities are
equally weakly substitutable with respect to the untaxed composite good:
qi
ki
= r, ∀i 	= 0 ⇔ εhi0 = α  0, ∀i 	= 0. (11)
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Proof See Appendix for the proof of this result. unionsq
For example, in the case of CO2 emissions, the weighted consumer prices qi/ki
in Eq. (11) may be interpreted as prices in terms of the carbon contained in different
types of fuel (cf. footnote 3); and the same interpretation applies to Theorem 1 and
Corollaries 1 and 2 if we write Eqs. (4)–(7) and (10) in terms of the weighted consumer
prices qi/ki . Finally, in the special case where the weights are all equal, i.e., ki =
k, ∀i 	= 0, we obtain a strict version of our uniform-pricing result:
Corollary 4 (Uniform-pricing result) Assume ki = k, ∀i 	= 0. Then, for the taxation
problem (1) the optimal consumer prices are all equal if, and only if, all commodities
are equally weakly substitutable with respect to the untaxed composite good:
qi = q ≡ rk, ∀i 	= 0 ⇔ εhi0 = α  0, ∀i 	= 0. (12)
Proof This result follows immediately from Corollary 3. unionsq
The result of uniform taxation, presented, for example, by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971), Sandmo (1974), and Sadka (1977), is formally obtained under the same elastic-
ity condition as is Corollary 3.12 However, in the basic optimal commodity tax problem
with n (or two) goods and leisure (good 0), Auerbach (1985, p. 90) and Auerbach and
Hines (2002, p. 1368) interpret the case εhi0 = α (∀i 	= 0) as meaning that all goods
are equally complementary to leisure.13 In this respect, Corollary 3 helps correct this
interpretation, for it shows that the cross price elasticities cannot be negative (but must
be non-negative), and hence the goods cannot be complementary to leisure.
The uniform-pricing result derived here and the familiar uniform taxation rule are
both obtained under the same elasticity condition, but their implications generically
differ: The uniform taxation rule is concerned with tax rates, i.e., t j/p j , while the
uniform-pricing result with equal weights (i.e., ki = k,∀i) is concerned with consumer
prices, p j +t j . Thus, the equal tax rates in the uniform taxation rule implies that higher
specific taxes should be imposed on goods with higher net prices. Yet, the uniform-
pricing result, viz. equal consumer prices, implies that higher taxes should be imposed
on commodities with lower net prices (provided that taxes are positive). In this sense,
the uniform taxation rule and the uniform-pricing result are at variance with each other
in general, and only coincide in the special case when all net prices are equal (i.e.,
pi = p,∀i 	= 0).
If all compensated cross price elasticities of the commodities with respect to the
composite good are equal and non-negative, then we have the uniform-pricing result.
On the other hand, if this equal elasticity condition does not hold, then we obtain
12 Sandmo (1974) also shows that this condition is satisfied when the utility function is weakly separable,
written as u(x0, f (x)), and the function f is homogeneous of some arbitrary positive degree. See also
footnote 7.
13 Similarly, Heady (1993, p. 33) states that “all goods have the same degree of complementarity or
substitutability with leisure”; Sørensen (2007, p. 387), that “goods and services are equally substitutable for
(complementary to) leisure”; and Boadway (2012, p. 54), that “all goods must be equally complementary
with leisure.”
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the anti-inverse elasticity result and the anti-Corlett–Hague result.14 Hence, the policy
implications of our problem depend on the values of the compensated price elasticities,
and it is important to investigate the empirical validity of the equal elasticity condition.
For the standard optimal taxation problem under a revenue constraint, as mentioned
in footnote 12, this equal elasticity condition is satisfied when the consumer has weakly
separable preferences (between the untaxed good, e.g., leisure, and the taxed goods)
and the sub-utility function (of the taxed goods) is positive homogeneous. Although
empirical studies frequently reject the hypothesis of weak separability (see, e.g., the
references provided by Jacobs and Boadway 2014, footnote 2), uniform commodity
taxation under weak separability is still a major issue in the contemporary literature,
and the discussion has even been freshened and accelerated by the Mirrlees review
(Mirrlees et al. 2011).15
In this paper, we consider a group of different commodities and their relations to
some untaxed good. In the literature there is an ongoing discussion on this relation
between close substitutes and some untaxed third good: For example, Borcherding
and Silberberg (1978) and Silberberg and Suen (2001, p. 340) argue that two close
substitutes such as a high and a low quality of the same good (e.g., apples) should be
similarly related to other goods (a composite good) and the asymmetry in this relation
seems to be “empirically insignificant.” However, Minagawa (2012) questions this
view, providing a conceptual qualification to this argument: suppose that there are
three goods, say high and low priced (quality of) coffee beans, and milk. Then, a rise
in the price of the high quality coffee leads to an exchange of one unit of this quality
for more than one unit of the low quality coffee (due to the exchange rate). The total
consumption of coffee beans thus increases, and correspondingly the total consumption
of milk also increases provided that the consumer always takes their coffee with milk.
In this case, the more expensive high-quality coffee beans and milk are substitutes
while the less expensive low-quality coffee beans and milk are complements.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of optimal commodity tax under a consump-
tion target: the government chooses consumer prices (or unit taxes) for the different
commodities of a specific group to maximise consumer welfare subject to the con-
straint that total consumption should meet a given target. To acknowledge the fact that
governments frequently do not strictly adhere to the target they have or are committed
to, we allow for some slackness in the achievement of the consumption target; yet,
there are costs of failure associated with and increasing in the discrepancy between
the consumption target and the actual level of consumption.
We demonstrated that the replacement of the familiar budget constraint by the
consumption target leads to taxation rules that are predominantly at variance with
14 Notice that we may rewrite Eq. (7) as q j = −D′k j εhj0/θ, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, by using the fact that
εhj0 = −εhj j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
15 The discussion on uniform commodity taxation in the Mirrlees review is based on Crawford et al. (2010),
and it is further explored by Bastani et al. (2015) and others.
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their traditional counterparts. In particular, we showed that higher consumer prices
should be charged for commodities with high price elasticities for the total demand
and low consumption shares. We then obtained an anti-inverse elasticity result: higher
consumer prices should be charged for commodities with a more elastic demand;
and an anti-Corlett–Hague result: higher consumer prices should be charged for the
commodity with the higher compensated price elasticity of the commodity with respect
to an untaxed good. We also derived the uniform-pricing result, which is at variance
with the familiar rule of uniform taxation (unless all net prices are equal): the same
consumer price for all commodities should be charged if, and only if, the compensated
price elasticities of the commodities with respect to the price of an untaxed good are
all equal and non-negative. We thus conclude from our analysis that the implications
for public tax policies crucially depend on (1) the type of the constraint—revenue
constraint vs. consumption target—and on (2) the values of the price elasticities of the
commodities with respect to an untaxed good. The choice of the specific constraint
should thus be made very carefully, and the values of the price elasticities must be
estimated with accuracy.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Ben Lockwood and two anonymous referees for their helpful and
inspiring comments.
Appendix: Proof of the generalised uniform-pricing result
We first prove the “only if.” For equal weighted consumer prices, qi/ki = r ∀i =
1, . . . , n, the right-hand side of Eq. (9) becomes (D′/r)∑ni=1 εhji . Using Hicks’
(1939) “third law,” we get (D′/r)∑ni=1 εhji = (D′/r)(−εhj0). Then, all εhj0 ( j 	= 0)
must be equal. This implies that all εhi0 and ε
h
0i (∀i 	= 0) have the same sign, since
∂xhi /∂q j = ∂xhj /∂qi . Also, using Hicks’ “third law” and the fact that εh00  0, we
obtain
∑n
i=1 εh0i = −εh00  0. Therefore, all εh0i and εhi0 (∀i 	= 0) must be non-negative.
Next, we prove the “if.”16 Suppose that all commodities are equally weakly sub-
stitutable with respect to the composite good, εhj0 = α  0, ∀ j 	= 0. Then, by
definition, ∂xhj /∂q0 = αx j/q0. Thus, by symmetry, ∂xh0 /∂q j = αx j/q0. Substituting





















, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (A-1)
The term within the parentheses in Eq. (A-1) is independent of j , and we denote
it by β, that is, ∂xm0 /∂q j = βx j/q0. Now, differentiating both sides of the identity∑n
i=0 qi xmi (q0, q, I ) ≡ I with respect to q j and using the above relation, we obtain
16 This is similar to the demonstration of the uniformity of tax rates in the basic optimal commodity tax
problem given by Sandmo (1974). See also Sadka (1977).
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= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (A-3)
Then, [μ/(1 + β)]qi − D′ki = 0, ∀i 	= 0 is a solution of Eq. (A-3).17 That is,
qi/ki = (1 + β)D′/μ, ∀i 	= 0. The solution is independent of i and may be denoted
by r .
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